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This study addresses a new way to pool financial resources through an open call on the internet – 
crowdfunding. As this new industry continues to grow and develop, it is important to evaluate its 
current status and recent developments to try to find clues about the future. 
The analysis conducted focused on the types of material incentives that crowdfunding platforms 
use to entice their users to invest and, more specifically, on the relationship between the types of 
incentives (equity, revenue shares, prizes, interests and donations - no incentives) and the total 
money raised by the platforms.  
Findings indicate that the type of incentive used by a crowdfunding platform has a significant 
impact on the amount of money it raises. Additionally, the most used type of incentive, prizes, is 
outperformed by other types of incentive in terms of total money raised. Consequently, and also 
considering recent developments such as the passing of legislation in the United States regarding 
crowdfunding, evidence suggests that crowdfunding could become an important alternative 
source of financing for startups and small companies. 
It is important for both investors and capital seekers to learn about the viability of crowdfunding 
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Acknowledgments 
I want to thank a few people for the opportunity to write this thesis and for helping me through 
this challenging process. I will start by thanking Professor Andrei Villarroel for inspiring in me 
curiosity for these subjects, for all his time, help and mentorship throughout this project. 
I’m also grateful to my parents for the opportunity to get a Masters degree and to all my friends 
and colleagues for their help and support. I would like to single out the colleagues from the “New 
Business Models for Online Distributed Organization” research seminar. Particularly, I would 
like to thank Diogo Onofre and Sofia Santos, with whom we worked on this seminar topic and 
who helped me immensely in the process.  
Crowdfunding: Material Incentives and Performance 
Henrique Matos | Católica-Lisbon School of Business and Economics  4 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ................................................................................................................ 2 
Preface  ................................................................................................................. 3 
I- Introduction ............................................................................................ 5 
II- Literature Review ................................................................................... 6 
2.1) The Knowledge Distribution in Society ...................................................................... 6 
2.2) Web 2.0 ...................................................................................................................... 6 
2.3) Crowdsourcing ........................................................................................................... 7 
2.4) Crowdfunding ............................................................................................................ 8 
2.5) Convergence Culture and the New Customer .............................................................. 9 
2.6) Bootstrap Finance & Crowdfunding ......................................................................... 10 
2.7) Research Hypothesis................................................................................................. 12 
III- Methodology ......................................................................................... 13 
3.1) Variables .................................................................................................................. 15 
3.2.1) Dependent Variable – Total Money Raised ........................................................................... 15 
3.2.2) Independent Variables – Types of Incentives ........................................................................ 16 
3.2.3) Control Variables ................................................................................................................. 19 
3.2) Data Analysis ........................................................................................................... 19 
IV- Results ................................................................................................... 20 
4.1) Overview ....................................................................................................................... 20 
4.2) Types of Incentives and Performance ............................................................................. 24 
V- Discussion and Conclusions ................................................................. 24 
VI- Limitations ............................................................................................ 28 
VII- Future Research ................................................................................... 29 
VIII- References ............................................................................................. 31 
IX- Appendixes ............................................................................................ 34 
 
Crowdfunding: Material Incentives and Performance 
Henrique Matos | Católica-Lisbon School of Business and Economics  5 
 
I- Introduction 
This study focuses on a funding alternative that involves pooling financial resources through an 
open call in the Internet. This alternative is called crowdfunding. It capitalizes on technological 
progress to deliver a solution that empowers crowds, by providing them the tools to join efforts 
and make an impact in society. Crowdfunding is still a very recent phenomenon, which is rapidly 
growing in importance. To illustrate this, one can observe the record breaking and successful 
fundraising campaign for the 2008 United States Presidential Election by President Barack 
Obama. President Obama’s campaign relied heavily on a large amount of small individual 
contributions by average citizens in its fundraising effort
1
. In other words, crowdfunding was 
instrumental in this historic campaign. 
There is still a lot to be discovered in the field of crowdfunding. This study addresses the 
question of the relative importance and success at fund raising of different crowdfunding 
mechanisms. It explores the relationship between what the investors give (i.e.: their money) and 
what they receive in return for their contributions (i.e.: material incentives). A better 
understanding of these dynamics should provide clues regarding the future of the industry. 
More specifically, the viability of the “for-profit” crowdfunding alternatives is addressed in this 
work. The need for a funding alternative for startups and small businesses was studied, as well as 
a possible way to solve this problem: through crowdfunding platforms that reward their investors 
with equity/revenue shares or interests, two of the incentive types considered. 
Regarding structure, this paper is divided in five main sections. The first part is a brief overview 
of the existing literature related to the topic, which is followed by an explanation of the research 
methodology followed. Then, two sections address the main findings (“Results”) and their 
implications (“Discussion and Conclusions”). Finally, the last section is dedicated to the main 
limitations of the study and some possibilities of future research. 
Overall, the goal of this study was to shed more light into this online phenomenon - 
crowdfunding – that is still largely unknown and new and, in the process, test the viability of 
different crowdfunding mechanisms to finance projects, startups and small businesses.  
                                                   
1 91% of the total receipts of the campaign (FEC 2008) 
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II- Literature Review 
2.1) The Knowledge Distribution in Society 
A firm, as defined by Ronald Coase in 1937’s The Nature of the Firm (Coase 1937), is a “cluster 
of resources and agents that interact through managerial command systems rather than 
markets”(Benkler 2002: 372). For Coase, what justified the existence of firms, as well as their 
boundaries, were the costs associated with coordinating economic activity in markets. These 
costs, such as the cost of enforcing property rights, were classified as “transaction costs”. 
(Benkler 2002) 
Friedrich A. Hayek stated that knowledge “never exists in a concentrated or integrated form”; it 
is rather dispersed in society. He argued that the fundamental economic problem is figuring out 
how to secure that knowledge. (Hayek 1945: 519) 
Hayek suggests that centralized models of organization are less efficient because they are not 
able to incorporate significant pieces of information that are dispersed. Eric von Hippel has added 
that knowledge is “not only distributed but also «sticky», that is, relatively difficult and extremely 
costly to move between locations”(Lakhani & Panetta 2007: 97; Von Hippel 2005: 11). 
2.2) Web 2.0 
Tim O’Reilly defined Web 2.0 as “the network as platform, spanning all connected devices; Web 
2.0 applications are those that make the most of the intrinsic advantages of that platform: 
delivering software as a continually-updated service that gets better the more people use it, 
consuming and remixing data from multiple sources, including individual users, while providing 
their own data and services in a form that allows remixing by others, creating network effects 
through an «architecture of participation,» and going beyond the page metaphor of Web 1.0 to 
deliver rich user experiences”(O’Reilly 2007: 17).  
Web 2.0 uses user-friendly interfaces and increasing speed in internet connections to boost the 
generation of content by users for an increasingly interactive experience. Web 2.0 breaks with the 
traditional sender-receiver model by enabling new forms of interactive communication 
(Kleemann & Voß 2008). It allows individuals from all around the World to share a common 
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environment where they can independently exchange opinions in a decentralized way and in real 
time. It also enables the aggregation of “disparate flows of ideas in one stream”(Brabham 2008: 
81). This four characteristics (i.e.: diversity of opinion, independence, decentralization and 
aggregation of the crowd) constitute the four necessary conditions for crowd wisdom (Surowiecki 
2010). Therefore, the web is a tool to gather collective intelligence (O’Reilly 2007). 
In 1945, Hayek identified a “need for a process by which knowledge is constantly communicated 
and acquired” (Hayek 1945: 530). Today one can say that web 2.0 has enabled this process and 
opened a new window of opportunity and challenge for modern firms. 
Going back to Coase’s notion that the firm’s existence and its boundaries are justified by 
transaction costs (Coase 1937), one can now further elaborate that the new potentialities of the 
web (e.g. broad band connections), its widespread adoption by a vast number of individuals, and 
the low and decreasing costs associated with its usage are significantly reducing the transaction 
costs and justifying the appearance of new solutions that make use of markets to coordinate 
economic activities and tap into the crowds. In fact, completely decentralized models of peer 
production have proven to be successful in open-source software development (Benkler 2002). 
Furthermore, when it relates to information production, “peer production has a systematic 
advantage over markets and firms” (Benkler 2002: 444).  
2.3) Crowdsourcing 
In 2006, Jeff Howe and Mark Robinson studied the new business model that tapped into the 
crowds and gathered contributions from a distributed network of individuals using the power of 
the web to produce an open call. Howe called this model crowdsourcing and provided the 
following definition: 
“Simply defined, crowdsourcing represents the act of a company or institution taking a function 
once performed by employees and outsourcing it to an undefined (and generally large) network 
of people in the form of an open call. This can take the form of peer-production (when the job is 
performed collaboratively), but is also often undertaken by sole individuals. The crucial 
prerequisite is the use of the open call format and the large network of potential laborers.” 
(Howe 2006) 
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A key element in this definition of crowdsourcing is the notion of a firm outsourcing specific 
tasks to the crowds.  Academic researchers have since sought to integrate the emergent concept 
of “crowdsourcing” into the existing theory of organization (Villarroel 2008; Brabham 2008; Van 
den Ende, Villarroel and Tucci 2009; Malone, Laubacher and Dellarocas 2010; Villarroel and 
Gorbatai 2011a).  Crowdfunding is an evolution of this concept involving monetary resources, 
which brings an additional element to the ongoing academic debate on the need for a theory of 
online distributed organization (Villarroel and Gorbatai 2011b).  
Furthermore, others have built on this base and added that the individuals in the crowd do 
contribute to the firm’s production process “for free or for significantly less than that 
contribution is worth to the firm” (Kleemann & Voß 2008: 6). This, among other factors, 
explains the strategic value of tapping into the crowds for the modern company (Villarroel 2011). 
2.4) Crowdfunding 
The concept of crowdfunding is relatively new and, therefore, there is still little literature on the 
subject. Lambert and Schwienbacher were among the first to provide a definition for 
crowdfunding. They stated that “Crowdfunding involves an open call, essentially through the 
internet, for the provision of financial resources either in the form of donation or in exchange for 
some form of reward and/or voting rights in order to support initiatives for specific purposes” 
(Lambert & Schwienbacher 2010: 6). 
This definition basically builds on a previous characterization of Crowdsourcing (Kleemann & 
Voß 2008) adding one specificity : the crowd contribution to the firm’s production process in this 
case is done by providing the financial resources required for the execution of a project. 
Other authors have identified traits that characterize crowdfunding. One of these particularities is 
that it is centered in customers, in the sense that they provide not only the financial resources, but 
also a personal support that enable the success of a certain project (Ordanini et al. 2011). Personal 
support essentially means that one person believes in the project and acts accordingly, it is a 
positive reinforcement. It can be used, for example, to determine the success chances of a certain 
idea or project before the commitment of significant financial resources, thus reassuring a third 
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party (e.g.: a bank) and effectively reducing risks significantly. A typical example of this 
phenomenon is the pre-sale of goods through crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter
2
. 
Besides the product itself (pre-sale), crowdfunders are being compensated through cash 
(interests), stocks, bonds, prizes or a share of the project’s revenue. In some cases they might be 
given voting rights or be publicly recognized through leader boards or virtual badges inside the 
community. Crowdfunders may also contribute without the expectation of compensation, most 
frequently to charity platforms/projects. (Lambert & Schwienbacher 2010)   
Although the term crowdfunding is relatively new and directly linked to the web (i.e.: web 2.0) 
the concept of gathering small amounts of money from a large pool of contributors has a long 
precedent in areas such as charity and political campaigns (Ordanini et al. 2011). The renowned 
18
th
 century composer Wolfgang A. Mozart, for instance, financed his work through advanced 
subscriptions (Hemer 2011). On this topic Jeff Howe, the “father” of crowdsourcing has stated: 
“Crowdfunding isn’t new. It’s been the backbone of the American political system since 
politicians started kissing babies. The Internet so accelerates and simplifies the process of 
finding large pools of potential funders that crowdfunding has spread into the most unexpected 
nooks and crannies of our culture” (Howe 2008: 7).  
2.5) Convergence Culture and the New Customer 
Marketing literature has investigated the role of customers in production for a long time
3
. Service 
marketing theory has explored the potential benefits of a greater customer involvement in the 
production process (Bendapudi & Leone 2003). However, it is mostly the case that the 
individuals participating are the potential customers of the service. This is not necessarily the 
case in crowdfunding (Ordanini et al. 2011). 
This literature helps us understand the benefits associated with a greater knowledge of the market 
needs that result from a dialogue between firms and customers. Another important contribution 
was provided by Eric von Hippel with the concept of “lead users”. He defined them as “users 
whose present strong needs will become general in a market-place months or years in the future” 
(v.Hippel 1986: 791). These users can be an important tool for a firm looking to develop new 
                                                   
2
 Appendix 1 – Kickstarter project 
3 For a chronological review of the literature on customer participation in production see (Bendapudi & Leone 2003) 
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products, providing valuable insight, or they can themselves participate in the creation of new 
products by either financing them or soliciting others to do it, for example.  
The service-dominant logic in marketing has contradicted the more traditional, more resource-
centric view of economic transactions. As a consequence of the value of a product being 
subjective, the customer can be seen as a co-creator of value (Lusch et al. 2007). Thus, it makes 
sense to increase the customer’s involvement in the production process. 
In fact, the relationship between customers and producers is becoming more complex and 
evolving from the traditional top-down and one-way process; moreover it is becoming an 
interaction
4
. Henry Jenkins has studied this “convergence”: 
“Convergence represents a paradigm shift – a move from medium-specific content toward 
content that flows across multiple media channels, toward the increased interdependence of 
communication systems, toward multiple ways of accessing media content, and toward ever more 
complex relations between top-down corporate media and bottom-up participatory culture” 
(Jenkins 2006: 243)  
Studies have shown that by surrendering control to customers, companies enhance their 
engagement and build brand equity (Schau et al. 2009). Therefore, customer participation can at 
times be solicited and/or enabled at a low cost and, as a result, yield higher commitment levels by 
these individuals, ultimately creating value for a given company. 
2.6) Bootstrap Finance & Crowdfunding 
One of the areas where crowdfunding can make a difference is in helping entrepreneurs satisfy 
their startups’ early financing needs. Some authors have studied seed funding and have concluded 
that there is a gap in this area: 
“(…) there is growing evidence that the focus and interest of venture capital is moving beyond 
early stage innovative start-up firms to later-stage investments. This shift in focus has created a 
significant ‘funding gap’ for early stage start-up ventures and has renewed both academic and 
practitioner interest in possible methods of promoting the aggregated pool of available capital to 
                                                   
4 Appendix 2 – “The emerging role of consumers as investors” 
Crowdfunding: Material Incentives and Performance 
Henrique Matos | Católica-Lisbon School of Business and Economics  11 
 
early stage start-up enterprises that are pre-revenue and yet to reach commercialization stages” 
(Ley & Weaven 2011: 85) 
A recent study has shown that the amount of seed and early stage capital raised has been 
decreasing for the last ten years. On 2010 this volume decreased 46% from the year before, more 
than doubling the total reduction for all venture capital funding (21% decrease). Although the 
global macroeconomic conditions explain the reduction of the funds raised in venture capital, 
they do not explain why seed and early stage capital are being more penalized. Figure 1 shows us 
the evolution of seed and early stage fundraising. One can see that the amount of capital being 
invested in these stages is diminishing as well as the number of funds operating in this segment 
(Poston et al. 2011). 
Figure 1 - Annual Evolution of Seed/Early Stage Fundraising 
 
It is suggested that if crowdfunding can effectively help close the current gap in early stage seed 
funding, it could have a major impact on the World economy, as currently most of the five 
hundred fastest growing companies in the US (Inc. 500 list) used bootstrapping
5
 to satisfy their 
initial financial needs (Bhidè 1992).  
                                                   
5
 Bootstrapping - “consists of using alternative financing ways than the traditional sources of external finance (e.g., 
bank loan, angel capital and venture capital)” (Lambert & Schwienbacher 2010: 7) 
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Some startups have trouble raising funds from traditional sources like banks because their 
business model is unique and it is difficult to measure their potential. However, having a crowd 
of investors pledging money to a certain startup can help the entrepreneur make a case that it is 
viable and has a market. Besides the financial support, there is also a very important signaling 
effect – the people investing, albeit small amounts of cash, believe in that project (Hemer 2011). 
Initially, entrepreneurs may be required to spend a lot of time and energy trying to finance their 
startups without any assurance of success in this particular endeavor. Michael Lutz, an 
entrepreneur and former CEO of GammaLink.Inc has stated that “raising money has become a 
disease. Entrepreneurs are wasting lots of brainpower scheming to raise money”(Bhidè 1992: 
110). Lutz and his partner, Hank Magnuski, both came up with $12.500 each to start the company 
after a year of unsuccessfully trying to attract venture capital. Some years after, they were 
successful in obtaining $800.000 in venture capital (Bhidè 1992), and ended up selling the 
company to Dialogic Corporation
6
. 
2.7) Research Hypothesis 
There are hundreds of crowdfunding platforms currently online. These platforms use a variety of 
incentives to attract their users to invest in the projects they host. Four major types of incentives 
handed out by platforms were identified: equity, revenue shares, interests and prizes. There are 
also platforms that don’t hand out any incentive (donation based).  
This study considers the evolution of crowdfunding and the data collected about the current state 
of the industry 
H1: The type of incentives that a crowdfunding platform uses to convince users to invest 
has a significant impact on its performance
7
. 
The first hypothesis tested was that the type of incentive that a platform gives to its investors has 
an impact on the total money raised by that platform. It makes sense that the users of a given 
platform feel compelled to invest in a project because of the material incentive they are rewarded 
with. In practice, it is substantially different to receive a personalized t-shirt or shares in a 
                                                   
6
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GammaLink 
7 Performance measured as “total money raised” by the platforms 
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promising startup. The point of this analysis is to find statistical evidence of the prominence of 
one type of incentive over the others. Different incentives may attract different types of investors, 
what we want to know in this instance is if by offering a particular incentive, a crowdfunding 
platform is more likely to raise larger sums of money.  
 H1.a: Platforms that use prizes as an incentive to entice investors will outperform the 
ones that don’t. 
Given that prizes are currently the most popular type of incentive (i.e.: most used by 
platform) it is hypothesized that it outperforms the other types of incentives.  
H2: There is an untapped market for crowdfunding platforms that reward their investors 
with the opportunity to make money through their investments. 
Finally, this study looks into the potential of crowdfunding to become an important source of 
revenue for its users. Currently, most users invest in crowdfunding because they want to support 
a particular project and/or for fun, but not necessarily to make considerable financial gains. I will 
try to find evidence that there is an untapped need for funding that can be satisfied through 
crowdfunding that the legislation is moving towards allowing these tools to become an effective 
solution and that users would be willing to invest in such terms. It is hypothesized that for-profit 
crowdfunding is underdeveloped and that there is potential for growth in this particular area. 
III- Methodology 
Thomas Malone’s The Collective Intelligence Genome was a significant inspiration for our work 
(Malone et al. 2010) and the related work that Professor Villarroel had developed while working 
with Professor Malone at the MIT Center for Collective Intelligence. Particularly, we received a 
template of the taxonomy of crowdsourcing from Professor Villarroel and worked in a team to 
characterize crowdfunding platforms using building blocks we identified by surfing through these 
platforms and by analyzing the existing literature. After this collaborative step to compile a 
complete database of crowdfunding platforms, I focused on the incentive schemes that the 
platforms were using and how they were related to their performance.  
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A list of three hundred and ninety crowdfunding platforms was compiled in total. However, some 
platforms were dropped from the analysis. The platforms included satisfied the following criteria: 
- They were active at the time of the analysis [“alive”] 
- They started operating before 2012 [“years active>0”] 
- The information regarding the total money they raised was available  
- They used only one of the five types of incentives [“specialized platforms”] 
We started by adding the platforms listed in the crowdsourcing.org website
8
. There were some 
platforms that weren’t listed in this website that we added. Some were referred to us by friends, 
colleagues and professors, others we simply came across when reading articles about 
crowdfunding. Our first sample had four hundred and fifty one platforms. Some websites were 
incorrectly listed as crowdfunding platforms (e.g.: Moodle) and were removed from our database. 
After all changes, we ended up with 390 platforms (n=390). 
We found most of the information we needed about the characteristics of the platforms on their 
websites (i.e.: FAQ, About, Terms of Use), on alexa.com (i.e.: traffic rank and other web metrics) 
and on their Facebook pages (i.e.: number of fans). Additionally, we contacted each one of the 
platforms individually, by e-mail or through a contact form available on their website, to solicit 
information. 
- All the platforms that started operating in 2012 were not considered because a significant 
portion had only a few months of activity and had no measurable success. If they were 
included, it would distort the results and create a bias.  This concerned twenty two 
platforms created in 2012.  
- All the platforms that weren’t operating at the time of the information collection weren’t 
considered as well. Some of them had notices on their website warning their former users 
that they were no longer active. Platforms where no activity could be detected, either on 
their website or on their Facebook page, were also deemed “inactive” or “dead”. Fifty 
four “dead” platforms were excluded. 
- All the platforms for which there wasn’t any information regarding total money raised 
were excluded from the analysis. Some platforms declined the request due to privacy or 
strategic concerns.  
                                                   
8 www.crowdsourcing.org 
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In the end, there was complete information for a subset of eighty platforms. 
3.1) Variables 
Table 1 summarizes the list of variables included in the analysis.  
Table 1 - Variables Summary 
 
 
3.2.1) Dependent Variable – Total Money Raised 
The performance metric used is the total money that a platform raised since its inception in US 
Dollars. This is the total amount that was effectively and permanently transferred from investors 
to the project owners (users that are raising money). Some platforms use the “all-or-nothing” 
model. This means that if a certain project doesn’t fulfill a predetermined funding goal by a given 
deadline, than the platform pulls back the funds that were pledged to that project and refunds the 
investors. Therefore, this kind of monetary commitment from the investor doesn’t add up to the 
total money raised number of the platform, at least not until the money is transferred without 
possibility of a refund. In short, this metric measures the effective amount of money raised, and 
not the money pledged. 
This information (total money raised) is important because it illustrates the volume of 
transactions that were intermediated by a crowdfunding platform. It is a performance measure 
that one can use in all types of platforms.  
The total money raised by each platform is expressed in US Dollars. Whenever the available 
number was expressed in any other currency, it was converted to US Dollars. 
Independent Dependent 
Iprizes¹ Total Money Raised 
Idonations¹ Control 
Ilending¹ Years Active 
Iequitysharing¹ Notoriety Index 
1. dummy variables 
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3.2.2) Independent Variables – Types of Incentives 
Project owners use different incentives to entice people to invest on their projects. Typically, 
what they can offer depends on the rules of the platform they choose to host their project(s). 
Therefore, different crowdfunding platforms specialize in different types of incentive schemes. 
Most use only one type of incentives; however, there are platforms that combine two. An 
example of this is the platform Apps Funder
9
. After thoroughly studying three hundred and 
ninety crowdfunding platforms, four major types of incentive schemes to attract investors were 
identified: prizes, interests, revenue shares/equity and donations (no incentives). All of the 
platforms were classified according to these criteria using dummy variables.  
In order to perform the analysis, four dummy variables were created identifying the platforms 
that used one, and only one, particular type of incentive (e.g.: iprize = platform that only uses 
prizes to reward investors). As a result, four mutually exclusive variables identify platforms that 
used only one of the following incentives: prizes, interests, revenue shares/equity and donations; 
iprizes, ilending, irevenuesharing, iequity and idonations, respectively. 
10
 
Equity and revenue sharing were bundled together for this analysis. The rational here being that 
both were long term commitments to a project from the investor and they might be perceived in a 
similar manner by them. The main goal of using this bundle was to see if it was possible to 
achieve more powerful results (while still solid) with a simplification of the data set. It was a way 
to test if the chosen variables were the most adequate ones.  
 





*all dummy variables 
 
                                                   
9Appendix 3 – Example of Platform with Multiple Incentive Schemes (Apps Funder) 
10
  The platforms that used more than one type of incentive were not considered in the analysis. Fifty one platforms 
used more than one of the five incentives.  
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Prizes 
Some crowdfunding platforms enable the project owners to offer prizes to their investors. The 
most common practice is for project owners to offer a product related to the project, the output. 
For example, some platforms allow music artists to offer their CD’s in return of financial 
contributions that enable the artist to record it. There is a wide range of prizes that can be offered 
to lure in investors such as T-shirts, pins and limited edition products. The variable analyzed 
(iprizes) included all the platforms that only use prizes as an incentive. This variable was set as a 
baseline and consequently dropped from the computed regressions to prevent collinearity (see 





Various platforms offer project owners the opportunity of rewarding investors with interests. In a 
process that is very similar to a regular loan, the project owner (borrower) reimburses the money 
to the investor (lender) after a certain and pre-determined period of time. He adds to this value a 
fee (interest) that usually depends on the risk of the investment, the inflation rate and the time 
value of money
12
. The variable analyzed (ilending) included all the platforms that only use 




 Equity and Revenue Sharing 
This variable is a result of the bundle of the equity and the revenue sharing variables. It includes 
platforms that only use either equity or revenue shares as an incentive, never both. Therefore, for 
the new set of four incentives, the independent variables remain mutually exclusive. The variable 
analyzed (iequitysharing) integrated all the platforms that only use either equity or revenue shares 
as an incentive. 
                                                   
11 Appendix 4 – Example of a Prizes Platform (Indiegogo) 
12
 http://www.investorwords.com/2531/interest.html 
13 Appendix 5 – Example of an Interests Platform (Rate Setter) 
Crowdfunding: Material Incentives and Performance 
Henrique Matos | Católica-Lisbon School of Business and Economics  18 
 
Equity  
Crowdfunding platforms that use an equity incentive scheme enable the project owners 
that utilize them to reward investors with a fraction of the company or the project they 
supported. The idea being that, if the project is successful, they can sell their participation 





Several platforms allow project owners to compensate their investors with a percentage of 
their future sales. For example: an investor funds part of the production of five thousand t-






There are several crowdfunding platforms that don’t award their investors material or measurable 
incentives. The motivations for investing in these platforms are mainly intrinsic (e.g.: satisfaction 
for helping a cause), since investors don’t get back any material reward for their investment. This 
setup is prevalent in platforms that raise money for charity organizations and/or projects. For this 
study, these platforms were labeled donation-based platforms. Some of them use social tools to 
reward investors, by recognizing publicly their efforts to help a certain cause. This type of social 
validation can be an important incentive to invest. The two most common ways to recognize the 
investor’s efforts are leader boards and badge systems. Leader boards rank the top investors in a 
certain platform and badge systems reward investors for various achievements (e.g.: raised more 
than x$, contributed to more than x projects, etc…). Investors may feel pressured to contribute 
more in order to improve their status/position within the community, particularly if their 
donations are not anonymous. However, there are also platforms that rely solely on the investors’ 
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 Appendix 6 – Example of an Equity Platform (ASSOB) 
15 Appendix 7 – Example of a Revenue Share Platform (Appbackr) 
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will to “do the right thing”. In these instances, the project in itself is the only way to compensate 
the investor. Investors will feel compelled to contribute only if they really believe in the outcome 
of the project or in the merit of the cause. The variable analyzed (idonations) included all the 
platforms that never hand out any type of incentive. Not included are, for example, platforms that 




3.2.3) Control Variables 
Years Active 
One of the controls implemented in the analysis was the control for years active. Platforms that 
operate for longer periods of time naturally have a higher probability of collecting a larger sum of 
money. Therefore, this variable was controlled for. 
Notoriety Index 
The second control variable added to the analysis was the notoriety index (Alexa). The notoriety 
index is computed by Alexa Internet by summing the number of links to a particular website 
“from sites visited by users in the Alexa traffic panel”
17
. Links from the same website are only 
counted once. This information is updated monthly and it’s available in www.alexa.com. Alexa 




The amount of links to a platform can have a significant impact on the total amount of money 
that a platform raises, so that was controlled for. 
3.2) Data Analysis 
 The data analysis was performed using STATA 12, a statistical software package.  
                                                   
16 Appendix 8 – Example of a Donations Platform (First Giving) 
17
 Description available in www.alexa.com 
18 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexa_Internet 
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Mutually exclusive independent variables that expressed the different types of incentive schemes 
were used in the analysis (see Table 2). The practical implication of this being that the platforms 
that used more than one type of incentive were excluded (e.g.: a platform that uses interests and 
prizes). Iprizes was chosen as a baseline variable in the analysis performed. This variable was 
picked because most crowdfunding platforms use prizes (see Table 4), particularly most of the 
new platforms (see Figure 3). For this reason, we chose the variable iprizes as the basis for 
comparison with the other types.  
An OLS regression
19
 of the logarithm of the dependent variable (i.e.: total money raised) was 
used for this analysis. The distribution of the logarithm of the dependent variable approximates a 
normal distribution, hence the choice of the regression. 
IV- Results  
4.1) Overview 
The table below (Table 3) contains a summary of the complete dataset (n=390). It is useful to 
understand some of the main trends and characteristics of the general sample, as well as some 
possible limitations of this study. 
Table 3 - Complete Dataset Summary (N=390) 
Incentive N Alive % Years Active>0 % Total Money Raised % Specialized 
Platforms % 
Donations 118 89.8% 94.1% 32.2% 99.2% 
Interests 49 95.9% 95.9% 51.0% 83.7% 
Revenue Share 24 91.7% 95.8% 37.5% 50.0% 
Equity 37 89.2% 94.6% 37.8% 64.9% 
Prizes 164 90.2% 90.2% 21.3% 88.4% 
Total 91.3% 93.1% 29.5% 86.9% 
In this table, prizes are the most popular form of incentive in crowdfunding platforms (n=164). 
Donation platforms are also significantly popular (n=118). It is also interesting to see that 
donation platforms are very specialized (99.2%); they don’t use any type of material incentive to 
                                                   
19 See more information on the regression on Appendix 11 - Detailed Statistical Analysis 
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attract investors. In contrast, half of the platforms that use revenue sharing utilize other types of 
incentives as well. Most of the identified platforms have been active for more than a year and 
were operating when the analysis was performed (93.1% and 91.3% respectively). Unfortunately, 
some platforms didn’t divulge the total amount they had raised since their inception. Only 29.5% 
of the platforms disclosed this information. This is a source of concern addressed in the 
“limitations” part of this thesis.  
The application of the above listed criteria resulted in a sample used to analyze performance (per 
incentive type) measured as total money raised (n=80). One can observe that the sample is 
significantly smaller than the complete dataset, due to a considerable amount of platforms’ choice 
not to reveal the total amount of money they had raised. We can see that only a small percentage 
of prizes platforms (16%) were included in this sample. The issue of low reporting by prizes 
platforms will also be discussed in “limitations”. 
Table 4 - Sample Information 
 
 
Table 5 shows the total money raised by platforms aggregated by type of incentive, the total 
money raised per year active of those platform types and the average money raised by year 
active
20
 (for each platform).  The results show that donations platforms raise more money overall, 
per year active and on average per year active. Although the most popular type of incentive is 
prizes (115 platforms), the platforms that use this type of incentive raise, in average, less money 
per year active than the interests, donations and equity platforms ($3.187.128 vs. $15.013.694, 
$14.686.874,  and $6.060.803 respectively).  
                                                   
20average money raised by year active =  
                                              
                   
 
Incentive¹ N Total Money Raised % 
Donations 105² 30% 
Interests 37 57% 
Revenue Share 10 30% 
Equity 21 38% 
Prizes 115 16% 
Total 288² 28% 
Years Active>0, Status: Alive 
1.variables are mutually exclusive 
2.the notoriety index isn't available for two of the platforms 
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Table 5 - Total Money Raised by Incentive Type (USD) 





Interests 21 1 843 444 055 315 287 580 15 013 694 
Donations 31 3 333 369 716 455 293 085 14 686 874 
Equity 8 188 102 603 48 486 420 6 060 803 
Prizes 17 156 848 620 54 181 173 3 187 128 
Revenue Share 3 9 577 634 4 983 634 1 661 211 
Total 80 5 531 342 628 
  Years Active>0, Status: Alive, Total Money Raised>0 
1. variables are mutually exclusive 
2. sum of total money raised per year active of each platform  
Regarding notoriety (measured with alexa.com’s notoriety index), the platforms that don’t give 
material incentives to investors (i.e.: donations) have the highest average notoriety. There are 
some possible explanations for the fact that donations platforms have the highest average 
notoriety (946).  
Most of the first crowdfunding platforms were created for charity purposes and used the 
donations model. In addition, the projects hosted by this type of platforms tend to be more 
“popular” by nature. That is, a charity cause hosted by a donations platform is more likely to 
garner widespread public attention than a “for-profit” small business project. 
Table 6 - Notoriety by Incentive Type 
Incentive¹ N Sum Notoriety Index Average Notoriety Index 
Donations 103 97 468 946 
Interests 37 30 069 813 
Prizes 115 81 368 708 
Equity 21 4248 202 
Revenue Share 10 1101 110 
Total 286 214254 
 Years Active>0, Status: Alive, Notoriety Index>0 
1. variables are mutually exclusive  
The amount of new platforms being launched every year has been consistently increasing for the 
past few years (Figure 2). Crowdfunding is a very recent phenomenon and, as one can see, this 
phenomenon only started to gain momentum as recently as 2007. Numbers show (Figure 2) that 
in 2007 alone, the number of new platforms launched equaled the amount of the six previous 
years (2001-2006) combined – twenty platforms.  
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Figure 2 - Number of New Crowdfunding Platforms by Year 
 
 
By looking at the yearly distribution of new platforms by type of incentive (Figure 3) one can see 
that prizes has become the most popular type of incentive for new platforms in the past two years 
(2010 and 2011). Prior to 2010, most of the platforms didn’t provide any material incentive to 
their investors (i.e.: strict donations model). 
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4.2) Types of Incentives and Performance 
To evaluate the impact of the chosen incentives in a platform’s performance, a set of four 
regression models was created (table 7)
21
. Total money raised was utilized as the dependent 
variable for all models; it was used throughout this work as a measure of performance for 
crowdfunding platforms. Model 1 includes only the independent variables. The two control 
variables were first added individually and separately (models 2 and 3). Finally, model 4 includes 
both control variables as well as the independent variables.  
The results of the last model (model 4) indicate that all incentive models outperform iprizes (the 
baseline for this analysis). Ilending has the largest impact, 2.192 (p<0.01), followed by 
iequitysharing, 2.007 (p<0.05). Idonations also had a statistically significant impact (p<0.1) of 
1.499.   
Table 7 - Impact of Incentives in Total Money Raised  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ilending +++ + +++ +++ 
Iequitysharing ++ • +++ ++ 
Idonations +++ • +++ + 
years active   +++   +++ 
notoriety index     +++ +++ 
+++ (positive impact p<0.01), ++ (positive impact p<0.05), + (positive impact p<0.1) 
• (impact is not statistically significant) 
baseline: iprizes 
See appendix 10 
Currency: US Dollars 
Additionally, results show that both control variables (years active and notoriety index) have a 
highly significant positive impact in total money raised. We can therefore conclude those 
platforms that have been active for more years and that have more websites linking to it tend to 
raise more money. 
V- Discussion and Conclusions 
The results from the analysis indicate that the type of incentive that a platform chooses to entice 
users to invest in the projects it hosts has an impact on the total money raised by that platform. 
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This confirms hypothesis H1. In Table 7 we can see that all types of incentives outperform prizes 
(the baseline) in terms of total money raised. The results are statistically significant
22
. Also, they 
contradict what was hypothesized in H1.a: that Prizes would outperform the other incentive 
types. Results prove that is not the case (see table 7). This is surprising considering that prizes is 
the most popular type of incentive (see Table 4) and most new platforms use this type of 
incentive (see Figure 3). 
These results also show that platforms that use equity, revenue sharing or interests can be very 
successful in raising money, in fact, more so than prizes and donations platforms. This may be a 
consequence of the development of the industry. In the beginning, crowdfunding served mostly 
(and almost exclusively) as a fundraising tool for charity organizations, and they used a simple 
donation-based model. Now, we are seeing that prizes platforms are becoming increasingly 
popular as investors start to demand something back for their contribution but still don’t look at 
crowdfunding as an important source of income. It is very difficult to accurately predict the 
future in this fast changing industry. Nevertheless, as investors demand more and legislation 
becomes more friendly, equity, interests and revenue sharing platforms will likely become more 
prominent, in line with what was hypothesized in H2. 
There is still room to improve “for-profit” crowdfunding models. These results, that show that 
these platforms raise more money than others, report to a period prior to the approval of the 
JOBS Act
23
. Also, the bill is just the first legislative effort concerning crowdfunding. The 
CrowdFunding Intermediary Regulatory Association (CFIRA) was created by thirteen major 
crowdfunding platforms to work alongside the government to develop new regulations and some 
members of Congress have been working to push more ambitious goals. For example, Rep. 
Patrick McHenry, who has led the first attempt to pass a law about crowdfunding
24
, has openly 
criticized the provision of the JOBS Act that prohibits general solicitation. This provision forbids 
platforms to use external sites to promote their projects. On the other hand, the results on Table 7 
show that notoriety (i.e.: the number of external links to the platform) is positively and 
significantly associated to the total amount of money it raises. So here we have an example of 
growth potential that is not yet realized. 
                                                   
22Appendix 10 – Regression Results 
23
Appendix 9 – The JOBS Act 
24 The Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act (McHenry 2011) 
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Experts and people from the crowdfunding industry have also argued that banks are having 
trouble coping with the changes in the modern business environment. They have been cutting on 
lending to small businesses and startups because they often experience trouble assessing risks and 
end up not profiting a lot from this practice. More specifically, it is very difficult for regular 
banks to assess the chances of success of creative and innovative businesses (Avery 2012). 
However, with crowdfunding risks can be mitigated with the help of a crowd. The fact that a 
significant amount of people believe in a business to the point that they put their own “skin in the 
game”
25
 is a powerful signal that it will do well in the market. By reducing uncertainty, 
crowdfunding can also help entrepreneurs finance their businesses at a lower cost (even if they 
choose to use bank loans on a later instance). Besides this, there are also efficiency gains to 
consider. Lending platforms operate online and can take advantage of smaller overheads to offer 
cheaper rates. Also, most use an auction system in which the lender that offers the lower rate gets 
the loan and the platform intermediates the process. Again, the potential in this area is immense. 
Overall, the crowdfunding industry has been growing exponentially (see Figure 2). The amounts 
of projects, platforms and investors have all been growing and are expected to continue to do so 
for the coming years. Based on the results of the present analysis and on everything I’ve seen and 
read, I believe the next stage of the evolution of the industry will be centered on the “for-profit 
platforms” (H2). Meaning: the platforms that reward their investors with a real possibility of 
being compensated in the future, either by paying interests or by giving them a part of the 
company (i.e.: shares). Once that is accomplished, crowdfunding would have become a full-
fledged alternative to traditional bank lending and a powerful tool for small businesses and 
startups.  
As an additional step, the twenty platforms with most money raised per year active were 
considered. The previous analysis yielded insights regarding the landscape of crowdfunding. 
However, it is interesting to take a look at only the top performing platforms as well. Table 8 
shows that half of the top twenty platforms use a donation model. A significant number of 
interest platforms are also present (i.e.:7).  
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Table 8 - Number of Platforms in Top 20¹ 
Rank Incentive # Platforms % Platforms in Top 20² 
1 Donations 10 50% 
2 Interests 7 35% 
3 Prizes 2 10% 
4 Equity 1 5% 
Years Active>1, Status: Alive, Total Money Raised>0 
1.Top 20 Platforms with highest total money raised per year active 
2.% of platforms in the top 20 platforms that raise more money per year active 
Almost all of the first crowdfunding platforms to be created used a donation model. However, on 
the last few years, other models have gained importance. 2009 was the first year where the 
majority of the crowdfunding platforms created were not donation platforms (see Figure 3). The 
technological progress of the last years has enabled a lot of people to buy, sell and invest in the 
internet (O’Reilly 2007). Crowdfunding has also been gaining popularity; creative projects have 
made the news and helped increase public awareness of the phenomenon. More people are able to 
participate (Benkler 2002) and more people know about this possibility. Data suggests that big 
projects have helped platforms in attracting more projects, users and funds. The scale of sites like 
Kickstarter has been increasing dramatically as of late and this is just another indicator of the 
growth potential of crowdfunding (Coldeway 2012). 
A study by Massolution, a research firm that recently conducted a survey of the crowdfunding 
industry, shows that more than one million crowdfunding campaigns have yielded approximately 
$1.5 billion dollars (US) in 2011(Empson 2012). Also, equity-based platforms are performing 
particularly well, growing at a 114% rate and have also raised more money per campaign 
(Empson 2012).  
Recently, governments have recognized the potential of crowdfunding by passing legislation to 
facilitate for profit crowdfunding
26
. Before, legislation either altogether prohibited or 
significantly conditioned for-profit crowdfunding, especially equity and revenue sharing models.  
On November 2009, Michael Migliozzi, a managing partner at an American ad agency, launched 
www.buyabeercompany.com. Michael had seen in the news that Pabst Brewing Co. (PBR) was 
on sale and decided to launch a crowdfunding campaign to buy it. After just two months and 
$210 million dollars (US) in pledges, Michael was contacted by the SEC and asked to depose. He 
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was unsuccessful in his attempt to buy PBR and experienced some legal troubles in the process, 
but his story attracted the attention of others and eventually led to changes in the field of 
crowdfunding (Sacks 2012) (see Appendix 9).  
The passing of the JOBS Act in the United States (see Appendix 9) can become a significant 
landmark for the industry of crowdfunding. This piece of legislation is the first to regulate 
crowdfunding in the United States, the country hosting 39% of the crowdfunding platforms 
identified, and the largest market in terms of investments in the industry (Empson 2012). The bill 
specifically aims at helping crowdfunding become an alternative for startups and small 
companies in the US, companies that have struggled to find financing as a consequence of the 
2008 global financial crisis (see Figure 1). What this shows is that there is a need for an 
alternative financing method for businesses and that legislation is easing to allow crowdfunding 
models that use equity and interests to become that alternative. This in part supports H2. 
It is likely that more legislation will be introduced in the next few years, if the industry continues 
to grow exponentially and the limitations of the current law are addressed. In the meantime, 
thirteen crowdfunding platforms created a self-regulatory body in the wake of the JOBS Act’s 
approval (Avery 2012). The newly created CFIRA
27
 will work with the government to establish 
best practices and industry standards (CFIRA 2012), in an effort to prevent fraud in 
crowdfunding and the consequent reputational damage for all platforms.  
VI- Limitations  
This study analyzed a sample of crowdfunding platforms. However, not all platforms chose to 
disclose all the information that could be relevant for the study. One can identify a few 
limitations in this study, mostly related to these platforms reporting discrepancies. First and 
foremost, the sample of platforms with total money raised information is relatively small (n=80), 
especially if compared to the total number of identified platforms (n=390).  
A particular concern is the low reporting in the prizes platforms (see Tables 3 and 4). Not even 
20% of the prizes platforms divulged the total amount of money they raised and, consequently, 
were included in the analysis. All of the other types of platforms had a significantly higher 
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(double or more) percentage of total platforms included in the final sample. This is unfortunate 
and can bias the results of the analysis, for example, if a significant number of prizes platforms 
that didn’t report their total money raised outperform the average. However, we have no data 
indicating that this is the case.  
Hopefully some of the platforms that weren’t available to disclose that information today will do 
so in the future. This would be the best way to overcome the identified limitations. 
VII- Future Research 
Crowdfunding is evolving at a rapid pace as entrepreneurs and governments gain awareness of it 
and explore its potential.  As such there is much left to be explored and understood about it. 
As recently as April 5, 2012 the JOBS Act
28
 was signed into law by President Barack Obama. 
This law includes a section that establishes a framework for the operation of crowdfunding 
platforms in the USA. The USA are currently, and by far, the country that hosts the most 
crowdfunding platforms (151 platforms out of 390). This law is expected to fuel the growth of 
the phenomenon of crowdfunding in the USA, particularly “for-profit” crowdfunding that 
supports startups and particularly equity and revenue sharing platforms. Future studies in this 
area can evaluate and measure the impact of the introduction of legislation like this. 
The UK government has also taken steps to stimulate the development of crowdfunding. On 
March 6, 2012 Seedrs became “the first equity platform to be approved by a major financial 
regulator in the World”(Seedrs 2012). The platform registered with the UK’s Financial Services 
Authority (FSA). 
The UK has particularly favorable legislation when it comes to lending platforms. By not 
imposing extremely high limits on minimum amounts raised
29
 and easing up on bureaucracy, the 
UK has an environment that allowed the appearance of successful platforms like RateSetter. 
These lending platforms have leveraged efficiency gains and to build a profitable business. 
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There is also the opportunity to serve an underserved market. Small business lending has been 
decreasing in the US and Europe. In 2011, $54billion dollars less were loaned to small 
businesses, comparing to 2008 (Avery 2012). Banks incur in a lot of costs to reduce the risks of 
loaning to small businesses and all for a relatively low payback.  
Going forward, it would also be interesting to have more contributions that help understand the 
motivations of the investors in crowdfunding platforms. Such an input could further clarify if in 
fact the investors are increasingly looking at crowdfunding as an important revenue source. 
Valuable contributions could also be made regarding the evolution of the public awareness of 
crowdfunding and the willingness to invest in such platforms. In essence, crowdfunding has had a 
meteoric rise and it will be interesting to find out if this phenomenon will continue to grow and if 
it evolves into a fully fledged alternative to traditional bank lending. 
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IX- Appendixes 
Appendix 1 – Kickstarter Project  
http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/hop/elevation-dock-the-best-dock-for-iphone?  
(Accessed on 22/05/2012) 
 
On February 11, 2012 product designer Casey Hopkins successfully raised US $1.464.706 to finance the 
production and distribution of an elevation dock for the Apple IPhone. He surpassed his funding goal (US 
$75.000) by pre-selling his product to 12 521 paying customers through the popular site Kickstarter.com, 
effectively guaranteeing the success of the project before actually investing money on production.
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Appendix 3 – Example of Platform with Multiple Incentive Schemes (Apps Funder) 
http://www.appsfunder.com 
(Accessed on 18/07/2012) 
 
Apps Funder is a crowdfunding platform that started operating in 2011. It specializes in the 
funding of projects to create mobile apps. 
This platform offers investors not only the app that they supported (prize), but also a cut from the 
revenues of that app’s sales (revenue share), in return for a financial commitment to fund the 
development of the app. 
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Appendix 4 – Example of a Prizes Platform (Indiegogo) 
www.indiegogo.com 
(Accessed on 23/07/2012) 
 
Indiegogo is an American platform launched in 2008. It supports a wide variety of projects (art, 
design, politics, etc...) and uses the prizes model. This means that each project owner posts 
his/her project in the website and establishes different contribution levels. For each level, there is 
a specific reward associated.  
For example, the project “Ascent for Survival” (http://www.indiegogo.com/ascentforsurvival) 
was created by two artists to raise money to fund their comic book novel’s production. They 
established six levels of contribution. The lowest level of contribution, $5, rewarded investors 
with a reference on the “thank you page” of the novel (pictured). The highest level, $500, 
rewarded investors with a signed and hand drawn original copy of the novel.  
Project owners in prizes platforms can offer a wide array of perks to their investors in exchange 
for their contribution. The value and importance of these perks is usually linked to the amount 
invested. Bigger investments typically yield better prizes. Among the most common rewards are: 
t-shirts, the output of the project and formal credits. 
Indiegogo charges the project owners with a percentage of the funds raised. 
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Appendix 5 – Example of an Interests Platform (Rate Setter) 
http://www.ratesetter.com 
(Accessed on 23/07/2012) 
 
Rate Setter is an UK-based platform that was launched in 2010. It is a P2P lending platform. It 
functions as a marketplace for loans that matches borrowers and lenders according to the 
conditions that both parts are looking for. The platform acts as an intermediary and charges an 
administration fee and a credit rate fee. 
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Appendix 6 – Example of an Equity Platform (ASSOB) 
http://www.assob.com.au 
(Accessed on 23/07/2012) 
 
Australian Small Scale Offerings Board (ASSOB) is a crowdfunding platform launched in 2004. 
ASSOB is an equity-based platform. The platform profiles a number of startups and companies 
and connects them with funders, who are looking to buy shares. This platform charges fixed fees 
for admission in the platform and for each month of a capital raising campaign. ASSOB also 
charges an 8% transaction fee over the raised funds. Besides access to a database, this platform 
also works closely with the companies who are looking to raise capital by helping them through 
the process (e.g.: legal compliance). 
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Appendix 7 – Example of a Revenue Share Platform (Appbackr) 
http://www.appbackr.com  
(Accessed on 23/07/2012) 
 
Appbackr is a US-based crowdfunding platform launched in 2010. This platform allows mobile 
app developers to fund their work by giving shares of future revenues to investors. The process is 
simple (see picture above). First, the investors buy revenue shares (a percentage of future 
revenues generated by the sale of the app). Once the app is finished, it is launched in a mobile 
app store. When the app store transfers the revenues generated by the sale of the app, the 
developer compensates the investor, as well as the platform.  
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Appendix 8 – Example of a Donations Platform 
http://www.firstgiving.com 
(Accessed on 23/07/2012) 
 
First Giving is a US-based crowdfunding platform launched in 2003. This platform follows the 
donation model, as it gives no material incentive to the users that invest in the projects hosted. 
First Giving hosts non-profit projects and accepts donations from a crowd of users. Additionally, 
this platform also allows the users to setup their own fundraising campaign. They can share their 
story and try to meet certain fundraising goals, all in favor of an organization. 
First Giving charges an annual fixed fee of $500 as well as a 5% commission on funds 
transferred to the non-profit organizations that use the platform.  
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Appendix 9 – The JOBS Act  
Patrick McHenry, a United States congressman from North Carolina’s 10
th
 district, led the first legislative 
effort to bring crowdfunding to the mainstream. On September 14, 2011 he introduced the Entrepreneur 
Access to Capital Act on the US House of Representatives (McHenry 2011). After some changes made to 
address concerns about fraud and investor protection, the bill passed in the House with bipartisan support. 
In the Senate, two new bills were introduced to regulate the industry. In the end, a compromise was 
reached and provisions from all the bills were included under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act 
(JOBS Act) (Sacks 2012). 
On April 5, 2012 President Barack Obama signed into law the JOBS Act. This law had bi-partisan support 
and included provisions intended to promote “for-profit” crowdfunding, namely by easing securities 
regulations. The bill established (Fincher 2011): 
- A $1million dollar (US) limit to crowdfunding securities transactions (that can be increased to 
$2million dollars if the company fully discloses its financials) 
- That users can invest up to $10.000 dollars or 10% of their annual income (if less than $10.000) 
- That intermediaries (crowdfunding platforms) have to file with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) 
- An increase of the limit number of shareholders and assets from which a company is required to 
register for a public offering 
- An exemption of certain registration requirements and prohibitions for crowdfunding platforms 
Most importantly, this bill is the first piece of legislation to create a framework for crowdfunding in the 
United States. More specifically, on title III, the bill defines both “crowdfunding”
30




                                                   
30 “Crowdfunding is a method of capital formation by which groups of people pool money, typically composed of 
very small individual contributions, and often via Internet platforms, to invest in a company or otherwise support an 
effort by others to accomplish a specific goal” 
31 (funding portal is)“any person acting as an intermediary in a transaction involving the offer or sale of securities 
for the account of others, solely pursuant to the crowdfunding exemption under this Act, that does not: (1) offer 
investment advice or recommendations; (2) solicit purchases, sales, or offers to buy the securities offered or 
displayed on its website or portal; (3) compensate employees, agents, or other persons for such solicitation or based 
on the sale of securities displayed or references on its website or portal; (4) hold, manage, possess, or otherwise 
Crowdfunding: Material Incentives and Performance 
Henrique Matos | Católica-Lisbon School of Business and Economics  43 
 
However, some feel like the bill could have gone further. Rep. McHenry defended a $5 million dollar 
threshold (instead of the $1million/$2million dollar one) and was particularly disappointed at the 
prohibition of general solicitation included in the bill (Sacks 2012). This provision effectively bans the 
platforms to solicit funding in, for example, social media websites (e.g.: Facebook, Twitter). This is a 
significant blow for platforms that have been riding the wave of the social media phenomenon and 
capitalizing on it to scale their business. 
Nevertheless, these first steps taken in the United States have an enormous impact on this global 
phenomenon. North America is the largest market for fundraising in crowdfunding, with $837 million 
dollars in 2011 (Empson 2012). Also, 151 of the 390 platforms I identified for this study (39%), and 31 of 
the 80 that comprised the studied sample (39%), are US based. Additionally, some of the most prominent 
platforms are American. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                    
handle investor funds or securities; or (5) engage in other activities determined by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Amends the SA to set forth qualification requirements for such crowdfunding exemption, 
including those for intermediaries and issuers” 
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Appendix 10 – Regression Results 





Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
ilending 2,983*** 1,683* 3,317*** 2,192*** 
  (0,933) (0,921) (0,797) (0,826) 
iequitysharing 2,167** 1,390 2,790*** 2,007** 
  (0,935) (1,025) (0,853) (0,900) 
idonations 2,601*** 1,061 2,774*** 1,499* 
  (0,841) (0,879) (0,689) (0,770) 
years active  0,572***  0,457*** 
   (0,128)  (0,131) 
notoriety index   0,000*** 0,000*** 
    (0,000) (0,000) 
_cons 12,276*** 11,232*** 11,617*** 10,955*** 
  (0,588) (0,595) (0,439) (0,480) 
Number of observations 80 80 80 80 
R2 0,123 0,352 0,314 0,447 
F 4,690 14,256 15,125 26,566 





Iprizes¹ Total Money Raised 
Idonations¹ Control 
Ilending¹ Years Active 
Iequitysharing¹ Notoriety Index 
1. dummy variables 
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Appendix 11 – Detailed Statistical Analysis 
Results from OLS Regression performed on the sample. 
 
Variance Inflation Factor for each dependent variable and each control variable. 
 
Low VIF coefficients indicate that there are no multicollinearity issues.  
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Appendix 12 – List of Platforms Analyzed 
1 Dollar 1 Home, 1% Club, 100 Days, 10Beyond, 33 Needs, 4 Just 1, 40 Billion, 8-Bit Funding, A8muf Crowdfund, 
ACCION, ActBlue, AcumenFund, Adbacker, Advert Activist, Africa Unsigned, Akvo, Ammado, Angel Shares, App 
Backr, Apps Funder, Artha Platform, Artiste Connect, Artistshare, Artspire, ASSOB, Ativa Ai, Babeldoor, 
Babyloan, Bananacash, Bandtastic, Bank to the Future, Bankeez, BBVA Friends and Family, BEEx, Benfeitoria, 
Better Place, Better World Network, Bloom VC, Boomerang, Busker Label, Buy Credit, Buzz Entrepreneur, 
Buzzbnk, Campfire, Cap Angel, Caring Bride, Carnet de Mode, Cashare, Catarse, Causes, CauseVox, Cauzoom, 
Changing the Present, Charity Factors, Chipin, Cine Crowd, Cinema Reloaded, Cinema Shares, Citizen Effect, Civic 
Sponsor, Civilised Money, CKIE, Cofolio, Cofundit, ComeçAki, Commonbox, Community Lend, Comproyecto, 
Comunitae, Couch Tycoon, Create Jobs for USA, Creative Selector, Crowd About Now, Crowd Cube, Crowd 
Culture, Crowd Mecca, Crowdbackers, CrowdBooks, Crowdfunder, Crowdfunding Facilities, Crowdrise, Crowdtilt, 
Deki, Demo Hour, DEVEXO, Donors Choose, Dream Bank, Dreamore, Early Shares, Education Generation, Ekjaa, 
Elveos, Embolacha, Emphas.is, Epic Change, Epic Step, Eppela, Eureka Fund, Everyday Hero, FABrique d'Artistes, 
Faithfunder, Fandyu, Feed The Muse, Field Theory, Film Funds, Finance Utile, First Giving, Fondeadora, Fondomat, 
Fondomat EU, Friendfund, Friends Clear, Frooble, Fund St. Louis, Fund Weaver, Fund:it, Funda Geek, Fundchange, 
Funded By Me, Funder Thunder, Funding 4 Learning, Funding Circle, Fundly, Fundraise, Fundrazr, Fundstarter, 
Geldvoorelklaar, Gesture Crowdfunding NZ, Give a Little, Give Corps, Give Forward, Givezooks, Givology, Go 
BIG Network, Go Fund Me, Go Get Funding, Go Give Social, Go Green Social, Good Return, Goteo, Greater Good, 
Greedy or Needy, Green Funder, Green Girl, Green Note, Green Unite, Grow VC, Helpedia, Helpers unite, Hope 
Mongers, Humanity Calls, I Grin, I make rotterdam, Ideacious, Ideame, Ikelmart, Impulso, Incentivador, Indie go go, 
Indulj, Ingressar, Injoinet, Inkubato, Innovestment, Interactor, Inuka, InVenture, Invest Fashion, Invested.In, 
Investiere, Investors Ally, Ioby, IOU Music, Ipledg, Ise Pankur, IWN Internship Fund, Jolkona, Just Giving, Justin 
Wilson Investor Club, Kachingle, Kapipal, Katipult, Kickstarter, Kifund, kisskissbankbank, Kiva, Kokos, Kopernik, 
Kreandu, Lainaaja, Lánzanos, Launcht, Lend With Care, Lending Club, LET'S, Libros, Loanio, Look at my Game, 
Loud Sauce, Lubbus, Lucky Ant, MakeITopen, Maneo, Mashup Finance, Massivemov, McKenson Invest, MeBlitz, 
MedGift, Media Funders, Mega Total, Mercy Corps, Mes Vignes, Micro Giving, Micro Graam, Micro Ventures, 
Microist, Microplace, Milaap, Mimoona, Mini Donations, Mobcaster, Mobile Movement, Movere, Movies Angels, 
Movimento 1 Euro, Mutuzz, My Azimia, My Major Company, My Micro Invest, My Projects (Cancer Research 
UK), My Sherpas, My Show Must Go On, My Witty Games, MYC4, Mycause, MyELEN, Myfootballclub, Namaste 
Direct, New Face Film, New Jelly, Nieuwspost, Nordstarter, Oocto, Open Genius Project, Opportunity International, 
Opportunity International Canada, Peerbackers, Peerform, People Capital, Peoplefund.it, Petridish, Philanthroper, 
PIFWORLD, Pirate My Film, Pixonauts, Plan Big, PleaseFund.Us , PledgeMe , PledgeMusic , Pledgie , Pling, Polak 
Potrafi , Porto24 , Poz.ycz, Pozible, PPDai , PPL, PRÊT D’UNION, Profounder, Project Powerup , Projectgeld, 
Prosper, Proyectanos , PUBSLUSH Press , Qifang, Queremos, Querk , Quero na Capa, Rally , Rang De , Rate Setter, 
Razoo , Rebirth Financial , Recoup , Respekt , Revenons à la musique , Revenue Trades , Ricebowlproject , Rippple, 
Rocket Hub, Rusini , Sandawe , SASIX, SaveTogether, Scholar Match , Schrijversmarkt , SciFlies , Seedmatch , 
SeedQuick, Seedrs, SeedUps, SeeYourImpact , Sellaband, Serial Liver , ShadeFund , Share a Gift , Share2Start , 
Sibite , SkyFunder , Slated , Small Change Fund, Smartnme, Smava , SocialWish, Socios Inversores , Sokap, Solar 
Mosaic, SoLoCo, Somesha, SoMoLend, SonicAngel, SOUP , Spacehive, Sponduly, Sponsorcraft, Sponsorgoal , 
Sponsume, Sponzu , Spot.us, spredbudskabet, Sprigster, Springboard, Sprowd, Start Next, Start Some Good, 
Starteed, StartersFund, Startup Addict, StoryFunded , Symbid, Talentboek, TechMoola , TenPages , The (Iw) Movie 
Project , The Hoop Fund , The Modest Needs, The One Percent Foundation , The Open Source Science Project , The 
People of Godspell, The Point, The Wisdom of Others, ThrillCapital, TipTheWeb , Touscoprod, Trustbuddy, Tu 
Mecenas, Twask , Uend, UJIMAA, Ulule, Unbound, Unglue.it, United Prosperity, Vakinha, Veecus, Venture Bonsai, 
Verkami, Vision Bakery , Vittana, Volanda, Voordekunst, WacaWaca, We fund, We komen er wel, WealthForge, 
Wegetthere , Wemakeit, WeSayWePay, WildlifeDirect, WiSEED , Wishbox , Wokai , World Penny Jar, Yesideias, 
Yes-secure, YouCaring, Zafèn, Zidisha, Zimple Money, Zopa  
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